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Voyeur Bodies, Liberating Identities
Hannah Hofheinz
“If you visit my city, Buenos Aires, please try and go see the women lemon 
vendors who sit in the streets of some neighborhoods.”1 No, rather, I welcome you 
now to Buenos Aires. In your theological imagination, I welcome you. I, Marcella, 
will be your guide for a few sentences. Here is the marketplace of Constitución, 
where my mother would buy chickens still warm. Do you see those stray dogs over 
there sleeping quietly in the door of the abandoned building? This is my barrio, 
San Telmo. Shall we sit for a few minutes over cortado? It is a good place to think 
– to think about postmodernism, liberation, the destruction of grand meta-narra-
tives. 
The first few pages of Indecent Theology invite us into Marcella Althuas-
Reid’s world. She tantalizes our senses: sights, sounds, tastes, and smells. Bodies 
come to life. Places materialize. Histories swirl with their tangled and complicated 
interplay. Our eyes roam. We not only see women selling lemons in the market-
place; our journey continues under their skirts, into their baskets. We hover in the 
midst of their interactions. Women without underwear, whose musky smell mixes 
with the scent of lemons and market. Skirts lifted: exposed, smelled, seen - by 
Althaus-Reid. Skirts lifted: exposed, smelled, seen - by us. 
* * *
Liberation theologies arise within and amongst the material fleshiness of 
located, local bodies. Indeed, the dunamis of liberation theologies erupts out of the 
material cries of embodied suffering experience. These cries disrupt and declaim 
dominant ways and forms of knowing; the cries catalyze personal and systemic 
transformation. Formulated strongly, theology not only must not, but cannot, 
render injustice invisible if its knowledge is produced by suffering communities 
brought together by the conditions under which they live.
Without doubt, this is a good thing. Theology must not be separated from 
the bodies and material conditions through which the transformative cries of 
liberation are given voice. The poor must speak. The marginalized must theologize. 
Theological knowledge occurs in - yea, belongs in and transforms through - the 
conversations, relationships, and praxis of communities that are most affected by 
the harmful systems of our world. Historically, these are often identity located 
communities: the oppressed, the poor, women, the 3/5s world, and so on. 
Perhaps then the introduction to Indecent Theology reads traditionally: 
Althaus-Reid places her theology as contextual and material, well within the tradi-
1 Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender and 
Politics (London: Routledge, 2000), 2.
tions of liberation. She locates the people, conditions, and experiences with whom 
she theologizes. She privileges complex experiences on the underside of systems 
of oppression, experiences that are hers as much as they are others’. Few readers 
of Indecent Theology, however, would allow the ease of this characterization to 
rest untroubled. Viscerally, Althaus-Reid brings about something disconcerting in 
these opening pages. Something tangibly different is underfoot.2 
This essay first seeks to express one way of characterizing what occurs in 
the early passages of Indecent Theology: Marcella Althaus-Reid introduces and 
deploys the role of voyeur. The voyeur, she proposes, attains a sexual knowledge 
that arises through an indecent performance of power. Second, the essay reflects 
constructively on what her analyses and performances of voyeurism might suggest 
for liberation theology: by transgressing decency, the voyeur’s gaze illuminates a 
productive ambivalence in ‘identity’ as a liberative construct. Ultimately, the essay 
suggests that Althaus-Reid consciously scribes, and thereby inscribes in us, a sexual 
knowledge of the voyeur’s indecent and guilty gaze. 
Why does this matter? Because it establishes the possibility of destabilizing, 
and thereby dismantling, reified boundaries of identity without losing an ability 
to aggregate the enfleshed and particular experiences of those suffering. In other 
words, Althaus-Reid shows us one way to enact a queer critique of identity in order 
to forward a liberationist project. 
“Voyeurism dislocates power and identity” Althaus-Reid writes. “The voyeur 
looks and sees in the other what the other cannot look at.”3 
In The Queer God, Althaus-Reid proposes that “one kenosis of a libertine 
God, which may occur, is that of the Voyeur God.”4 Immediately thereafter, she 
draws out insights that surface when the voyeur is allowed as a libertine theologi-
cal resource. 
It might be helpful to pause momentarily to recall that, for Althaus-Reid, 
“queer theologians are the ones who consider to what excesses God takes God’s 
love for humans.”5 Subservient to heteronormative ideologies, theology has “tamed 
or limited these [Divine] villainies.”6 Thereby, theologians have falsely, and 
2 Althaus-Reid’s position within, and relationship to, liberation theology is complex. She 
is deeply committed to liberation theology, but a liberation theology that can confront the sexual 
ideologies and marketplace economies at the heart of its own theological thinking and knowledge 
production. Althaus-Reid strives for a liberationist theology engaged with the power analyses of 
postcolonialism and the recognition “that theology has been and will remain a sexual praxis” (Queer 
I stand, 100). This essay does not explore this broader issue, but instead works to characterize one 
indecent element Althaus-Reid employs, namely voyeurism. To read Althaus-Reid on the question 
of liberation theology, see for example: Marcella Althaus-Reid, From Feminist Theology to Indecent 
Theology, and “’Let Them Talk …! Doing Liberation Theology from Latin American Closets” in 
Marcella Althaus-Reid, Liberation Theology and Sexuality. 





harmfully, contained the excessiveness of Divine love, just as we have falsely and 
harmfully bounded the possibilities of our desire and love for each other. In other 
words, the visions of love allowed by heteronormative theologies fail to encompass 
the possibilities of love. This includes not only our human love for one another 
and for God, but also God’s love for us. God’s love exceeds decency. Divine love 
overflows heteronormative relationships, patterns, and interactions. God’s love 
embraces us; it touches us indecently. 
Heteronormative theologies have refused the excess of Divine love in prefer-
ence for the decent. Indecent theology, on the other hand, refuses to tame the 
excesses of Divine love, however villainous the excesses might appear. In danc-
ing with scandal, queer theologies recognize that to limit the possibilities of love 
makes for not only a sexual problem (which it is, to be sure) but also political, 
economic, and theological problems. Indeed, Althaus-Reid argues the four inter-
twine, and they do so inseparably. Take, for example the character of the villain. 
Historically, the villain represents an evil and a poor person. The villain is “what 
we would call today the dangerous stranger at our gates.”7 Morality, economics, 
theology, and politics are held tightly – and complexly – together. “By taming the 
villainous vocation in theology, we have made of poverty and sexuality strang-
ers, evil strangers.”8 Theology, she insists, needs to recover the possible: the excess 
of love that stands outside the gates of heteronormative decency. For this reason 
liberation theology needs the libertine.  
The libertine, Althaus-Reid explains, moves into spaces beyond social and 
political approval. She resists the normalization of sexuality, especially the limits 
of binary heterosexuality. She attends to any and all political powers that non-
consensually map the territories of the decent and the indecent. Not once or every 
now and then does she do this, but over and over again. Each time the libertine 
transgresses into illicit space, bodies are rearranged and variations of interrela-
tion are set into motion. This continues until the scene becomes saturated and its 
possibilities are exhausted. The scene then dissolves so that a new scene, with new 
arrangements of bodies, can and will be established. The libertine begins again. A 
new scene commences replete with new variations and new interrelations.9 Each 
scene is revelatory, but also arbitrary and exhaustible. This is Althaus-Reid’s repeti-
tion and variation of Hénaff’s repetition and variation of Sadean libertinism.10 
It is a scene in this sense that Althaus-Reid establishes when she writes: 
“We can expect the kenosis of a libertine God, and we are going to explore this in 
different forms in this book. One kenosis of a libertine God, which may occur, is 
that of the Voyeur God.”11 The Voyeur God is a libertine God who transgresses 
decency in order to inhabit the illicit relational positioning of the voyeur. The 
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 24.
9 For more on libertine hermeneutics see especially Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, pgs. 26-
30.
10 Marcel Hénaff, Sade: The Invention of the Libertine Body, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999).
11 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 42.
Voyeur God rearranges bodies and puts into motion a particular set of varied 
interrelations. In doing so, the Voyeur God establishes a scene as described above, 
one that is theologically revelatory but also arbitrary. The scene will continue until 
its possibilities are exhausted. When exhausted, the scene will dissolve so that a 
new one can be established. 
Take note: this Voyeur God is neither ultimate nor originary. Epistemologi-
cally, the Voyeur God allows neither a comprehensive overview nor an essential 
point of access. Rather, with the Voyeur God, Althaus-Reid welcomes her readers 
into a scene, just one scene amongst the many various variations of many pos-
sible possibilities. I want to stress this lest one confuse this scene with an illusion 
of a whole, or lest one mistake its unnecessary positioning with an illusion of a 
teleologically ordered series. This is simply and only one transgression; it enlivens 
for theological consideration one possible indecent kenosis of a libertine God. That 
is it. This is enough. 
One last remark: Althaus reminds her readers that, “if we are going to use 
the libertine’s constructions of the voyeur as a theological resource, we must realize 
that there are different options here.”12 Sade, Freud, Lacan, Foucault, DeCerteau, 
Mulvey, scopophilia, the camera’s gaze. There are many interpretive frameworks 
by means of which to think about voyeurism. Even amongst those who read this 
essay, I imagine that a range of possibilities are very much alive. For the next few 
pages, however, our interest belongs solely within the space of Althaus-Reid’s 
scene, the space that she initially inhabits with Bataille and his Madame Edwarda.
“In Bataille, and specifically in Madame Edwarda, it is as if God demands 
the voyeur. God manifests herself only to the voyeur and God relates to the one 
who searches for the divine as a voyeur too.”13 
Madame Edwarda recounts an erotic theophany. The first sentences narrates 
Pierre Angelique’s anguished late night walk through the streets: “I feel I have got 
to make myself naked, or strip naked the whores I covet.”14 Slipping off his pants, 
he “coasts on a wave of overpowering freedom,” but “not wanting trouble” he 
dresses again and heads into a brothel.
Here, Pierre finds himself returned from darkness to light and in the midst 
“of a swarm of girls.”15 Madame Edwarda stands utterly naked, exposed, and 
bored. Pierre sees her, chooses her, clutches her, kisses her, shares a moment of 
“shattering” and “terror” with her. Pierre tells us that a terrible pressure of im-
manent grandeur pushes down a dark stillness, which wraps him in an all-encom-
passing forsakenness, a painful unhappiness. The forsakenness is, Pierre reports, 
12 Ibid., 39.
13 Ibid., 39–40.




as when “one is in the presence of GOD.”16 Pierre tells himself that he is being 
ridiculous. No words have been exchanged. 
All this in the first six paragraphs. All this from Pierre. Then, a short break: 
confusion for Pierre, a shift in narrative for us. Now, Madame Edwarda speaks 
and acts. 
You want to see me, she says. She lifts her leg; she exposes herself fully to 
Pierre, to all of his senses. 
“Why are you doing that?” Pierre stammers. 
“Because, as you yourself have seen, I am God,” she replies.17 
Indeed, as Pierre has seen. As Pierre has already seen, but now sees again.
This saturated scene of God’s self-revelation accompanies Althaus-Reid 
throughout her writings. Here, she draws our attention to an erotic relationship of 
seeing and being seen: God (literally) exposes herself to Pierre’s gaze. In Althaus-
Reid’s words: “Through voyeurism, the protagonists understand and God speaks 
because, demanding the voyeur, God also shows God’s voyeuristic vocation.”18 
To be fulfilled, the complex relationship occurring between the seer and the 
seen requires the participation of both. When Pierre walks in the room, he sees 
Madame Edwarda, and he identifies her as God. Pierre the voyeur determines the 
identity of those around him, most importantly the identity of Madame Edwarda. 
While he refuses to acquiesce to the knowledge that she is God, he experiences this 
fact as surely as he sees her as an object of his desire. This might seem to privilege 
Pierre’s activity while relegating Madame Edwarda to passivity. The story, however, 
does not stop here. Madame Edwarda exposes herself to Pierre. In doing so, she 
demands his gaze – a voyeur’s gaze that was already active but which, through this 
repetition, is rendered explicitly mutual and dialogical. 
The voyeurism that interests Althaus-Reid implicates both the seer and the 
seen as mutually active participants in the indecent performance. In this scene, 
God calls on Pierre, and he responds. The voyeur is divinely commanded. Patterns 
of desire and erotic relationality connect Pierre to Madame Edwarda as seer and 
seen, voyeur and voyeured. Althaus-Reid argues that when God is located in these 
erotic relationships as either seer or seen, the violent sexual exclusions of power are 
disrupted; sexual salvation becomes possible.19 
What transpires with the voyeur’s gaze? Per Althaus-Reid, a dislocation 
of power and identity. In her words: “The voyeur looks and sees what the other 
cannot look at. The voyeur masters the people, conditions, and interactions of the 
body in location. From what perspective does the voyeur understand? From all the 
perspectives of watching with impunity, adding the pleasure of new angles, of all 
16 Ibid., 149.
17 Ibid.
18 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 39.
19 Althaus-Reid draws on Foucault to make this argument. See Michel Foucault, The Birth of 
the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).
the angles and non-authorized points of view.”20 Note the interaction of mate-
riality, context, bodies, positionality, and location in this description. A voyeur 
is concerned with material, fleshy bodies that are located, contextualized, and 
actively in relationship. 
A voyeur watches with impunity, outside the bounds of legitimization, 
and therefore a voyeur’s gaze can escape the confines of dominant ideologies. 
Indeed, Pierre the voyeur enjoys (suffers?) a vision of God’s revelation that escapes 
the ideological confines of decent expectations. Due to its indecency, a voyeur’s 
identification of the persons with whom she is in relationship – and the ideas and 
knowledge that stick to them – has the potential to liberate. A voyeur’s gaze can 
rest upon and recognize what decency disallows. For marginalized communi-
ties and individuals rendered invisible, the revelatory possibilities of this indecent 
relationship matter. 
What needs to be asked is whether identities revealed and recognized within 
the voyeur-voyeured relationship can indeed be liberative. It is frequently protested 
that the determining quality of a voyeur’s gaze subjects those watched. I wonder 
though, is there a needed ambivalence, a productive instability between liberation 
and guilt?
In her response to Indecent Theology, Emilie Townes strongly critiques 
Althaus-Reid’s voyeurism. “From the comfort of my blackness and my sexuality 
and my economic privileges / i read about these women and was made immedi-
ately uncomfortable and angry / i was being cast into the unwanted role of voyeur 
/ unintentionally / but deliberately.”21 Remember the Hottentot Venus, Townes 
warns, whose living black body was displayed for white consumption, or when 
dead, whose cadaver was laid open, dissected, and catalogued so that its elements 
could continue to be viewed. Is this what happens with the lemon vendors? Does 
Althaus-Reid write her readers into a situation where as voyeurs we objectify bod-
ies that are imprisoned to remain simply the object of our gaze – without material-
ity, history, or interrelation? 
Althaus-Reid insists no, and I agree with her to the extent that the voyeur 
relationship with which we are here concerned is the one performed by Pierre and 
Madame Edwarda. In Althaus-Reid’s words: “Who defines us re-defines herself 
too…The identity construction of the voyeur’s gaze has a [dialogic] mutuality.”22 
That being said, Townes’ discomfort articulates an essential consideration: the 
guilt of voyeurism. Indeed, the voyeur’s gaze, as Althaus-Reid herself argues, “is 
the path to transient desire, but also to guilt.”23 
A voyeur’s gaze is necessarily implicated in patterns of power – sexual, 
economic, and political. Pierre recognizes Madame Edwarda as God through an 
experience of taking possession of a prostitute’s body. Pierre’s material knowledge 
of Madame Edwarda’s divinity is shaped through certain patterns of interaction 
20 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 42.
21 Emilie M. Townes, “Panel Response to Marcella Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology,” 
Feminist Theology 11, no. 2 (January 1, 2003): 170. 
22 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 43.
23 Ibid., 42.
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even as it is liberated from some theological exclusions of decency. Put differently, 
a voyeur sees according to the constructed possibilities available to her. These pos-
sibilities, like all cultural constructions, will be inescapably problematic. This does 
not countervail their potential to be liberative, but the potential both for guilt and 
for liberation must be held in tension. 
I submit that this is true for all identities. Identities are illusory products of 
power, often largely subsisting in the seer/seen relationship because of the extent 
to which the visual is emphasized. We should be uncomfortable when confronted 
with them. Voyeurism does not allow this ambivalence to be hidden: guilt surfaces 
even as identities are reconfigured so as to make the invisible visible or the mar-
ginalized recognized. A voyeur’s gaze can liberatively transcend decency. A voyeur 
cannot, however, escape the webs of power formed in and around people’s bodies 
and their interrelationships. A voyeur will be guilty of what she sees, but that does 
not make what she sees any less important or even –potentially– revelatory. 
As readers, we see, smell, touch, and taste Althaus-Reid’s lemon vendors. 
By writing us into an “I see you” relationship with these women, Althaus-Reid 
inscribes in us the sexual knowledge of a voyeur’s gaze. Through desire, a voyeur’s 
gaze renders the invisible visible. And not just visible, but living, contextualized, 
and interrelated in a fleshy, material sense. In this case, it is communities whose 
gender and sexuality have been removed from liberationist projects, but whose theo-
logical voices and theological knowledge are essential within liberation traditions.
Coming into an “I see you” relationship disrupts this dehumanizing invis-
ibility. But the sexual knowledge of a voyeur’s gaze, as a product of libertine 
hermeneutics, cannot be stabilized; it is fleeting, partial, and only one configura-
tion of bodies amongst many possible variations. When saturated it must be dis-
solved. It is liberative, and it is guilty. This is an important challenge for liberation 
theologies, whether or not the voyeur is at stake. Remember: Do not place too 
much importance on the voyeur. It is only one possibility, but it matters. Identities, 
and the privileges (and pains) they confer, are material and true, but they are also 
fundamentally instable, insufficient, and guilty constructions. 
